as much as 1½ points, which exceeds the dip that may have occurred in the second half of the 1960s and that in the early 1950s. However, since the natural rate concept means the unemployment rate when equilibrium is prevailing in all markets (where equilibrium means correct expectations), it may well be that not all of this structural boom represents a genuine drop of the natural rate -a possibility that I will recognize later on. As critics of the natural rate see it, this uncommon decline of joblessness unaccompanied by any appreciable rise in wage inflation comes as a revelation confirming their long-held belief in the inutility and invalidity of the natural rate idea. They say that if the natural rate moves unpredictably or mysteriously, that renders it useless for predicting and understanding the determination of the level of economic activity and its
fluctuation. The irony of this complaint coming from Keynesians is that
Keynes himself centered his model around the marginal efficiency of capital, which was a purely subjective entity reflecting the animal spirits of entrepreneurs. Precisely because of its unpredictability, Keynes was not optimistic that either wage setters operating in decentralized markets or monetary-policy makers operating from the governmental center could succeed very well at stabilizing the level of activity around its equilibrium path.
The critics' complaint betrays an odd philosophy of science. In physics there is no insistence on explaining a particle's every quantum jump, or indeed any jump (as Einstein famously complained). We in the social sciences are accustomed to have to cope with knowing only a part of the behavior of the systems we study. In any case, the critics are premature: it remains to be seen whether the surprising development can be interpreted as a structural boom in a way that will satisfy most scholars.
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As I see it, though, this uncommon development is grist for the mill of those of us who have been making endogenous natural rate models over the past ten years -both the recent intertemporal models (e.g., Phelps, 1994) and the latest static models (from Salop, 1979 , and Calvo, 1979 , to Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991 . In fact, it invites a new focus that promises to be exciting. In my 1994 book, for example, with its models of the equilibrium path of unemployment, the focus was on how some presumably secular parametric changes shift the equilibrium path (generally the entire path) and the emphasis was on the end-point of that path -the steady-state unemployment rate -or at least on the mediumterm stretch of the path, since the background to that research was the secular rise of joblessness in the OECD nations between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s. The same framework can be used, however, to show how some presumably cyclical forces can perturb the equilibrium unemployment rate over the near term while not necessarily lowering the end-point of the equilibrium path. (This second focus in natural-rate research would draw it closer in spirit to the neoclassical RBC models though major contrasts in their view of information would remain.) This paper is an effort to assemble my preliminary thoughts on this new focus, the cyclical fluctuations in the natural rate (defined as the unemployment rate over the near term given by the current equilibrium path). 4 Part I sets out my thesis that the inflationless expansion since early 1995 is, in large part, a genuine structural boom -one driven by possibly cyclical, though apparently nonmonetary, forces -and it presents some supporting empirical results, graphical and statistical. Part II concludes.
I. The Role of Enterprise Asset Valuations
The overarching theme of my structuralist models (Phelps, 1994) is that the valuation of firms' assets -human investments in employees and in customers as well as investments in tangible capital -is the proximate force driving the demand for labor; and the income from workers' wealth drives the "wage curve," which governs the cost of labor; the development of these two sets of forces shapes the equilibrium path of unemployment. The asset valuations are the net resultant of the stream of expected future returns on the assets on the one hand and the discount on future returns entailed by real interest rates net of productivity growth rates. The income from workers' wealth includes the pecuniary and imputed returns on the (foreign and domestic) assets they own, both their private wealth and their social wealth, notably their entitlements from the state.
My collaborators and I have obtained positive results in testing the latter hypothesis against Italian and U.K. data on private wealth (Phelps, 1997; Phelps and Zoega, 1998) and have found social wealth to be significant in those countries and also in the U.S. (Phelps and Zoega, 1997) . On the former hypothesis, we have consistently found a significant and not unimportant role for the world real rate of interest (Phelps and Zoega, 1997, 1998) . See also the findings of Blanchard (1997) . To date, though, no one has confronted the record of unemployment rates directly with time series on the valuation of the assets enterprises invest in, human and other, as inferred from stockmarket (and capital-good industry) prices.
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The recent period provides observations of corporate asset valuations far above normal experience. And fortunately it comes only two decades after the observations in the 1970s of prices and earnings far below normal experience. In the interim, if previous research is right, the structure of the economy has changed in some respects: Among adverse developments, private wealth is up relative to productivity and social wealth too; world real interest rates rose to a new plateau in 1981. Perhaps the most dire shift is one hard to quantify, the burden that learning to use the new information technologies must put on workers with little basic education.
Among the positive developments is the sensational shrinkage in the number of workers without a high-school diploma and the number without any college, both as proportions of the labor force. In this short exploratory paper, in order to focus on the role of the prices of enterprise assets, I will take the risk of abstracting from these shifts with one exception: Since the educational composition of the labor force has changed so much, I will look only at the unemployment rate of the bottom educational group, high school dropouts, or at the index of unemployment constructed by averaging the within-education-group unemployment rates using fixed weights from the base year (Phelps and Zoega, 1997) . The unemployment rate series for the four education groups are shown in Figure 1 . 6 Let us first consider a single asset market indicator, market capitalization per unit of fixed capital. It captures to a degree both of the attributes that make assets desirable to invest in: the profit rate, as measured by corporate profit per unit of corporate fixed capital, and the price that investors are willing for current earnings, as measured by the price-earnings ratio, the reciprocal of the earnings yield. (In fact, market capitalization, Q, as a ratio to the capital stock, K, is the product of the earnings rate, E/K, and the price earnings ratio, Q/E.)
There are several reasons why this capitalization variable (Q/K) enters positively into the aggregate labor demand function. First, if expenditure by firms on employee training and customer acquisition were unnecessary for maximum profit, this capitalization variable (that is, would be equivalent to Tobin's q; its excess over one indicates the profit to be obtained by acquiring fixed capital assets at a real price of one when their real worth (in present value terms) is q, so it indicates the attractiveness of additional fixed investment. Increased fixed investment tends to raise the real demand wage at given employment, since some capital-goods industries, notably construction, are conspicuously more labor-intensive than production as a whole and since, even if all industries had the same factor intensiveness, capital is not instantaneously shiftable, so that the real prices of capital-goods output are driven up, thus raising the marginal value productivity of labor in the capital-goods industries. Second, in my theoretical system, firms have to invest in their workforce to create functioning employees and have to invest to obtain customers. When capitalization increases, it may indicate that the profits on these human assets or their market value (or both) have increased. So firms will then hire more workers and trim mark-ups, thus raising their demand wage in terms of product. So employment is increased through these channels as well. To my eye, it is striking that in the 1970s, when the asset value indicator was depressed, the employment variable was mostly falling, and that by the early1990s, when the value indicator was setting record highs, the employment variable was strongly rising. 8 Let us now examine how each of the two forces lying behind the valuation of enterprise assets, the price-earnings ratio and the profit rate, appear to influence the motion of employment. Clearly, asset valuation can go up because profitability has gone up or because investors are willing to pay more for the same earnings, either because real interest rates have gone down or future expected earnings have gone up. And not all models of the capital and credit markets imply that these two events, if they happened to exert the same pull on asset valuation, would be equivalent in their stimulus to employment. Figure 4 records the price-earnings ratio, p/e, derived from the S&P 500 composite index of stock prices. From its neighborhood of 18 in the early 1970s that series fell proportionately farther, then nearly quadrupled to around 30 in 1998. Since the unemployment rate of high school dropouts and the index of unemployment rates in the four education groups did not come close to regaining their levels in the early 1970s, one wonders whether the price-earnings ratio has a role to play. A strand of radical thought has always held that the stock market is merely a sideshow.
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A regression was run with the fixed-weight index of unemployment rates exhibited in Figure 1 . The left-hand side variable is the employment increase from the previous year expressed as a ratio to the current-year labor force. The right-hand side is a quadratic expression in the discrepancy between the steady-state employment rate predicted by the two independent variables and the previous year's employment rate. The second term, the squared discrepancy, permits the discrepancy to show diminishing returns in its contribution to employment growth.
( ) 
Both explanatory variables are highly significant (the t ratios are shown below the coefficients) and the coefficient of the log of the price-earnings ratio is not far below that of the profit rate.
3 According to these coefficients, a doubling of the price-earnings ratio or of the profit rate, in increasing the log by 1.0 an thus the discrepancy by about 0.4, would raise the steady-state N/L by 0.4 -an impressive fall of the unemployment rate by 4 points. 
II. Concluding Thoughts
The thesis here is that the natural rate does not shift only with changes in demographics, institutions, taxes, the global economic climate and so forth.
Forces apt to be cyclical also drive the natural rate. In my framework, the real valuations of the sorts of assets that enterprises invest in are a key force and they may exhibit cyclical fluctuations. The preliminary findings here sustain my thesis that share prices are a powerful driver of the employment rate.
Apparently they are a good proxy for the valuations of the underlying assetsfunctional employees, loyal customers, and tangible capital. And KeynesTobin arbitrage between stocks and assets may go on as well.
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Much more research will be needed before we can feel assured about (On productivity growth see Pissarides, 1990, Hoon and Phelps, 1997.) Another question that hangs over this paper is whether the recent fall of the structural volume of unemployment is a genuine fall of the natural rate or instead the attainment of an unnatural unemployment rate borne of misforecasts about future real interest rates or future real returns. I have merely argued that structural forces involving the real prices of assets are at work. 1 In the theoretical framework here, there is an equilibrium path of the unemployment rate corresponding to the economy's present (initial) state. In this paper and my latest papers generally, I take the present natural rate to be the unemployment rate on this path at the present time. If there are hiring-cost frictions slowing the adjustment of employment to current condition, we may think of the present natural rate as its value on the equilibrium path a year or so ahead, when most of the adjustment to present conditions will have been made.
